Republic of the
Supreme Court
FIRST DIVISION
FELIX M. CRUZ, JR., G.R. NO. 148544
Petitioner,
Present:
PANGANIBAN,
C.J.
(Chairperson)
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
COURT
OF APPEALS, NATIONAL
LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION
AND
CITYTRUST BANKING
CORPORATION, Promulgated:
Respondents. July 12, 2006
x-
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
Before
the Court is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court seeking to annul the April 27, 2001 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 52373 which affirmed the January 27, 1998 Decision of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and its Resolution, dated May
14, 1998 in NLRC NCR CA 011087-96 (NLRC NCR 00-10-06448-93-A).
The
factual and procedural antecedents of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as
follows:
Cruz
[herein petitioner Felix M. Cruz, Jr.] was an employee of private respondent
Citytrust Banking Corporation (or Citytrust) from
But
after all his years of reputed fealty and good service with the company,
something unexpected and besmirching was uncovered. There were feedbacks and
informations that certain irregularities were being committed in the bidding
process and purchase of computers, an area within the powers and
responsibilities of Cruz. To clarify matters, a special investigation was
conducted by the Citytrust Internal Audit Group and it was found out that
indeed there were unauthorized and unreported commissions and rebates given out
by one of its computer suppliers, MECO Enterprises, Inc. (MECO), for purchases
made by Citytrust. This was corroborated by the letter dated
With
this damaging result of the investigation, Citytrust sent a show-cause
memorandum (Exh. “13”, p. 161, rollo) to Cruz on
Aggrieved
by this, Cruz filed before the Labor Arbiter an action for Illegal Dismissal
and Damages claiming that Citytrust denied him due process and hastily
dismissed him from service. After the submission of position papers and
presentation of witnesses, the Labor Arbiter rendered decision in favor of Cruz
disposing that:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment
is hereby rendered, ordering respondent to reinstate complainant to his former
position without loss of seniority rights with full backwages which up to the
promulgation of this Decision amounted to THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY SEVEN THOUSAND
SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY (P387,790.00) Pesos, subject to adjustment upon
actual reinstatement; to pay complainant his 13th month pay in the
sum of THIRTY TWO THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FIFTEEN & 83/100 (P32,315.83)
Pesos; and to pay the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) Pesos as and
for damages, plus attorney’s fees in the sum of FORTY SEVEN THOUSAND TEN &
58/100 (P47,010.58) Pesos representing ten percent (10%) of the monetary
award due complainant, subject also to adjustment.
SO ORDERED.”
(p. 26, rollo)
From
this decision Citytrust appealed to the NLRC, which through its Second Division
rendered the Decision dated
Cruz filed a motion for its
reconsideration but this was denied for lack of merit….[2]
Cruz
then filed a petition for certiorari with this Court. In a Resolution
dated
On
Instead
of a motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari
predicated on the following grounds:
THAT
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSE(D) ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN SETTING ASIDE THE DECISION
OF THE LABOR ARBITER A QUO
THAT
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN CONCLUDING THAT EXHIBITS 2
TO 10 [IN] WHICH PETITIONER’S SIGNATURE DOES NOT APPEAR,
THE FACTS REMAIN THAT HE BENEFITED FROM THE ALLEGED ANOMALOUS TRANSACTIONS, ONE
MA. CRESENCIA MANGUERRA ENCASHED THE CHECK USING THE BANK ACCOUNT OF PETITIONER
ALLEGING THAT THE LATTER IS PETITIONER[’S] PARAMOUR.[5]
Petitioner claims that while his name
appears in the check vouchers issued by MECO, marked as Exhibits “2” to “10”,
the incontrovertible fact remains that his signature does not appear in any of
said vouchers. Not being a signatory of any of the said check vouchers,
petitioner contends that there can be no basis in concluding that he ever
received any commission, special discount or rebate from MECO. Petitioner also
asserts that he was denied due process because he was not given the opportunity
to refute the charges imputed against him. While it is true that private
respondent conducted an investigation, petitioner claims that the same was done
without his participation.[6]
In its Comment, private respondent
contends that the present petition for certiorari is not the proper
remedy to assail the subject decision of the CA. Private respondent asserts that a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may be availed of only
when a party has no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Petitioner
argues that what petitioner should have done was to file a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, and that petitioner’s
failure to file a petition for review cannot be remedied by the filing of a
special civil action for certiorari. Even assuming that petitioner is
allowed to institute the present petition for certiorari, private
respondent contends that the same must still be dismissed because what is being
assailed are the factual findings of the CA and the NLRC and settled is the
rule that in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
judicial review does not go as far as to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence upon
which the NLRC based its determinations, the inquiry being limited essentially
to whether or not said tribunal has acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. In any case, private respondent
further contends that petitioner failed to prove that the CA committed grave
abuse of discretion because pieces of documentary and oral evidence bear out
the fact that petitioner indeed received various amounts from MECO either as
commission, special discount or rebate without private respondent’s knowledge
and approval.[7]
The
Court does not find merit in the present petition for the following reasons:
First,
it is well settled that the remedy to obtain reversal or modification of
judgment on the merits is appeal.[8] This is true even if the
error, or one of the errors, ascribed to the court rendering the judgment is
its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the exercise of power in
excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion in the findings of facts or of law
set out in the decision.[9] In the present case, the
CA disposed of CA-G.R. SP No. 52373 on the merits. Petitioner claims that he
received the Decision of the CA on
Second,
assuming for the sake of argument that the present petition for certiorari
is the appropriate remedy, the records of the instant case show that petitioner
failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the appellate
court, thus, depriving the CA of the opportunity to correct on reconsideration
such errors as it may have committed. The first paragraph of Section 1,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court clearly states that in order for a person to
avail of the special civil action of certiorari, he must be left with no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, to wit:
SECTION 1.
Petition for Certiorari. – When any tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment
be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board of
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
(Italics supplied)
A
motion for reconsideration of an assailed decision is deemed a plain and
adequate remedy expressly available under the law.[12] The general rule is that
a motion for reconsideration is indispensable before resort to the special
civil action for certiorari to afford the court or tribunal the
opportunity to correct its error, if any.[13] This rule is subject to certain recognized
exceptions, to wit:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a
quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari
proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or
are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the
question and any further delay would prejudice the
interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the
action is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration
would be useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is
extreme urgency for relief;
(f) where,
in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting
of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for
lack of due process;
(h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the
petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public
interest is involved.[14]
None
of these exceptions are present in the instant case. Hence, petitioner’s
unjustified failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
CA before recourse to this special civil action was made calls for the outright
dismissal of this case.
Third,
going into the merits of the case, the Court finds that the dismissal of the
instant petition is warranted for failure of petitioner to show grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the CA.
Petitioner
was dismissed from employment on the ground, among others, of loss of trust and
confidence. Loss of trust and confidence, as a valid ground for dismissal, must
be substantiated by evidence. Jurisprudence has distinguished the treatment of managerial
employees or employees occupying positions of trust and confidence from that of
rank-and-file personnel, insofar as the application of the doctrine of trust
and confidence is concerned. In Caoile
v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court had occasion to explain
as follows:
Thus,
with respect to rank-and-file personnel, loss of trust and confidence as ground
for valid dismissal requires proof of involvement in the alleged events in
question, and that mere uncorroborated assertions and accusations by the
employer will not be sufficient. But as regards a managerial employee, the
mere existence of a basis for believing that such employee has breached the
trust of his employer would suffice for his dismissal. Hence, in the case of
managerial employees, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required, it being
sufficient that there is some basis for such loss of confidence, such as when
the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee concerned is
responsible for the purported misconduct, and the nature of his participation
therein renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his
position.[15]
(Emphasis supplied)
In
addition, the language of Article 282(c) of the Labor Code states that the loss
of trust and confidence must be based on willful breach of the trust reposed in
the employee by his employer. Such breach is willful if it is done
intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as
distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or
inadvertently.[16]
Moreover, it must be based on substantial evidence and not on the employer’s
whims or caprices or suspicions otherwise, the employee would eternally remain
at the mercy of the employer.[17] Loss of confidence must
not be indiscriminately used as a shield by the employer against a claim that
the dismissal of an employee was arbitrary.[18] And, in order to
constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act complained of must be
work-related and shows that the employee concerned
is unfit to continue working for the employer.[19] In addition, loss of
confidence as a just cause for termination of employment is premised on the
fact that the employee concerned holds a position of responsibility, trust and
confidence[20] or
that the employee concerned is entrusted with confidence with respect to
delicate matters, such as the handling or care and protection of the property
and assets of the employer.[21] The betrayal of this
trust is the essence of the offense for which an employee is penalized.[22]
There
is no dispute that petitioner is a confidential employee. During his
cross-examination, he testified that aside from evaluating and recommending the
purchase of Micro Computers, he also supervises the maintenance of computer
hardware including the installation of computers for Citytrust in all of its
branches nationwide.[23] It is clear from the
foregoing that petitioner is not an ordinary rank-and-file employee. His job
entails the observance of proper company procedures relating to the
acquisition, installation and maintenance of computers which, undeniably, are
vital to the operations of his employer. Moreover, his functions are not
limited to a specific unit of Citytrust but extend to all branches of his
employer nationwide. Thus, his job involves a high degree of responsibility
requiring a substantial amount of trust and confidence on the part of his
employer.
The
question that remains then is whether there is substantial evidence to prove
that petitioner is guilty of the charges imputed against him as to justify
Citytrust in dismissing him from employment on the ground of loss of trust and
confidence.
Petitioner
contends that without his signatures appearing in the check vouchers issued by
MECO, there can be no basis in coming up with the conclusion that he received
and appropriated commissions and rebates without the knowledge and authority of
Citytrust.
The
Court is not persuaded.
Petitioner’s
reliance on the case of Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development Corp. v.
National Labor Relations Commission[24]
is misplaced. In the said case, the private respondent, who is an employee of petitioner corporation, was charged with the unauthorized
withdrawal and misappropriation of 192 liters of gasoline from company stocks
and for knowingly allowing company personnel to work on company time in the
assembly of a privately-owned vehicle. To prove the first charge, the
petitioner company presented in evidence entries in a logbook showing gasoline
withdrawals allegedly made by private respondent. In ruling against the
petitioner company, the Court held that since respondent’s signature does not
appear in the logbook, there is no proof that he actually withdrew and received
the gasoline. In fact, the Court ruled that the logbook cannot be relied upon
to establish the alleged dishonesty of private respondent. Neither did the
Court give credence to the testimonies of the witnesses against him. In sum, no
competent evidence was presented to prove the private respondent’s liability.
This is not the situation in the present case.
It
is true that the check vouchers alone are not sufficient to prove his guilt
owing to the fact that his signatures do not appear in any of these vouchers.
However, aside from the abovementioned check vouchers, there are other pieces
of evidence presented by Citytrust which petitioner failed to refute and which
points to the fact that he received commissions or rebates from MECO. The
evidence consists of the following: (1) admission made by petitioner in his
letter, dated August 3, 1993, that he received material considerations from
MECO since 1992;[25]
(2) certification issued by MECO categorically stating that he was paid
commissions totaling P105,192.00;[26] (3) testimonies of Leoncio Araullo, Vice President of Citytrust;
and Ma. Lourdes Foronda, Assistant Vice President for Staff Services Division
of the Human Resources Department of Citytrust, that
petitioner admitted having received the amounts of P1,000.00 and P500.00
from Art Cordero, an officer of MECO,
claiming that these amounts are “for the boys”; (4) statements in the affidavit
of Florante del Mundo, auditor at the Internal Audit Department of Citytrust
that two of the checks issued by MECO in favor of petitioner were either
encashed by the latter’s common-law-wife or deposited in his account.[27] In addition, the Court
agrees with the CA that annotations appearing in the check vouchers issued by
MECO such as “Payment for the Rebate Given to Boy Cruz of Citytrust”[28] and “Payment for the
Sales Rebate Given to Boy Cruz of Citytrust”[29] are confirmations of the
fact that the checks were issued and given specifically by MECO to petitioner
in consideration of his office and services. These pieces of evidence, when
taken together, would constitute substantial evidence to prove petitioner’s
guilt; and his failure to satisfactorily explain or rebut them only strengthens
Citytrust’s case against him.
Thus,
petitioner’s acceptance of commissions and rebates from MECO, without the
knowledge and consent of Citytrust and without said rebates and commissions
being reported and turned over to the latter, are acts which can clearly be
considered as a willful breach of the trust and confidence reposed by Citytrust
upon him. Settled is the rule that an employer cannot be compelled to retain an
employee who is guilty of acts inimical to the interests of the employer.[30] A company has the right
to dismiss its employees if only as a measure of self-protection.[31] This is all the more true
in the case of supervisors or personnel occupying positions of responsibility.[32] In the present case, the
Court finds that the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it ruled
that Citytrust is justified in dismissing petitioner from his employment for
loss of trust and confidence.
Petitioner
contends that he was denied his right to due process because the investigation
conducted by Citytrust was done ex-parte and he was not given the
opportunity to confront the witnesses against him. Petitioner’s concept of the
opportunity to be heard is the chance to ventilate one’s side in a formal
hearing where he can have a face-to-face confrontation with his accusers. It is
well settled that the basic requirement of notice and hearing in termination
cases is for the employer to inform the employee of the specific
charges against him and to hear his side and defenses.[33] This does not, however, mean a full
adversarial proceeding.[34] The parties may be heard through pleadings,
written explanations, position papers, memorandum or oral argument.[35] In all of these instances, the employer plays
an active role by providing the employee with the opportunity to present his
side and answer the charges in substantial compliance with due process.[36] In the present case,
petitioner cannot claim that he was denied due process because he was able to
respond to the letter of Citytrust dated
As to the
requirement of notice, the Labor Code provides that before an employee can be
validly dismissed, the employer is required to furnish the employee with two
(2) written notices: (a) a written
notice containing a statement of the cause for termination to afford the employee
ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself with the assistance of his
representative, if he so desires; and, (b) if the employer decides to terminate
the services of the employee, the employer must notify him in writing of the
decision to dismiss him, stating clearly the reasons therefor.[40] Citytrust
complied with the first requirement of notice when it informed petitioner
through a letter, dated August 6, 1993, of the charges against him, directing
him to explain in writing why his employment should not be terminated and,
thereafter, to appear in a hearing to be conducted by the company to give him
further opportunity to explain his side.[41] Citytrust also complied
with the second requirement of notice when it sent a memorandum dated
WHEREFORE,
the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO ROMEO J. CALLEJO,
SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA
V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Justice Roberto A. Barrios and concurred in by Justices Ramon Mabutas, Jr. (retired) and Edgardo P. Cruz.
[2] CA rollo, pp. 198-200.
[3]
[4] 356 Phil. 811 (1998).
[5] Rollo, p. 10.
[6]
[7]
[8] Manacop, et.
al. v. Equitable PCIBank, et. al., G.R. No. 162814-17,
[9]
[10] Delgado v. Court of Appeals, et. al.,
G.R. No. 137881,
[11] Rosete v. Court of Appeals, 393 Phil. 593, 600 (2000).
[12] Madrigal Transport Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation, G.R. No. 156067, August 11, 2004, 436 SCRA 123, 136.
[13] Metro Transit Organization, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 440 Phil. 743, 751 (2002).
[14]
[15] 359 Phil. 399, 406 (1998).
[16] P.J. Lhuillier, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 158758, April 29, 2005, 457 SCRA 784, 798.
[17]
[18] Fujitsu Computer Products Corporation of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 158232, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 737, 760.
[19]
[20] Philippine National Construction Corporation v. Matias,
G.R. No. 156283,
[21] Caingat v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No. 154308,
[22]
[23] TSN,
[24] 352 Phil. 1088 (1998).
[25] Exhibit “N”/ “14”, records, p. 68.
[26] Exhibit “Q”, records, p. 73.
[27] Exhibit “15”, records, p. 172.
[28] Exhibit “10”, id. at 33.
[29] Exhibit “11”, id. at 34.
[30] MGG Marine Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 328 Phil. 1046, 1067 (1996).
[31]
[32]
[33] Homeowners Savings and Loan Association, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 330 Phil. 979, 1001 (1996).
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37] See Exhibit “N”/”14”, supra.
[38] TSN,
[39] Sunrise Manning Agency Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 146703, November 18, 2004, 443 SCRA 35, 43 citing Paat v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 146 (1997).
[40] Arboleda v. National Labor Relations Commission, 362 Phil. 383, 389 (1999).
[41] Exhibit “M/”13”, records, p. 67.
[42] Exhibit “O”/”15”, records, p. 70.